Braess’s Paradox

I had the great fortune of seeing a talk by Brian Hayes on Braess’s Paradox, an interesting network congestion phenomenon. In this post I’ll talk about the problem, and some ramifications for other fields.

The Problem

Consider a network of four roads. Two roads are extremely wide, and are effectively uncongested, regardless of how many cars are present. They still have speed limits, so we’ll say there’s a constant traversal time of “one hour” for these roads. The other two roads, while more direct and thereby faster, have only a few lanes, and are extremely prone to congestion. As an estimate, we’ll say the speed it takes to traverse these roads scales linearly with “N”, the number of cars on the road, such that if all the cars are one one road it will take one hour to travel on.

Plain Network

If a driver wants to get from point A to point B, what route is fastest? Clearly, by symmetry, the two paths are the same length. Therefore, the driver should take whatever path is less-congested, or select randomly if congestion is equal. Since half the cars will be on each path, the total commute time is about 1.5 hours for all drivers.

However, consider the following change:

Magic Shortcut Network

In this network we’ve added a new path that’s extremely fast (no speed limits, because they believe in freedom), to the point that we’ll consider it instantaneous.

What is the optimal path for a driver now? A lone driver will obviously take the first direct road, then the shortcut, then the second direct road. However, if all “N” drivers take this route the small roads will be overloaded, increasing their travel time to one hour each. The total commute for each driver will now be two hours.

Consider that you are about to start driving, and the roads are overloaded. If you take the short route your commute will be two hours long. However, if you take the long route your commute will be two hours long, and the other roads will be less overloaded (since without you only N-1 cars are taking the route), so everyone else will have a commute slightly shorter than two hours. This means from a greedy algorithm perspective there is always an incentive to take the more direct route, and help perpetuate the traffic problem.

Simply put, adding a shortcut to the network made performance worse, not better.

The Solution

There are a number of potential solutions to the problem. Law enforcement might demand that drivers select their routes randomly, saving everyone half an hour of commute. Similarly, self-driving cars may enforce random path selection, improving performance without draconian-feeling laws. These are both “greater good” solutions, which assume drivers’ willingness to sacrifice their own best interests for the interests of the group. Either of these solutions provide an incentive for drivers to cheat - after all, the shortcut is faster so long as there are only a few people using it.

Another option is limiting information access. The entire problem hinges on the assumption that users know the to-the-moment traffic information for each possible route, and plan their travel accordingly. Restricting user information to only warn about extreme congestion or traffic accidents effectively prohibits gaming the system, and forces random path selection.

Generalization

Braess’s Paradox is an interesting problem where providing more limited information improves performance for all users. Are there parallels in other software problems? Any system where all nodes are controlled by the same entity can be configured for the “greater good” solution, but what about distributed models like torrenting, where nodes are controlled by many people?

In a torrenting system, users have an incentive to “cheat” by downloading chunks of files without doing their share and uploading in return. Consider changing the system so users do not know who has the chunks they need, and must made trades with various other nodes to acquire chunks, discovering after the fact whether it was what they were looking for. Users now must participate in order to acquire the data they want. This may slow the acquisition of data, since you can no longer request specific chunks, but it may also improve the total performance of the system, since there will be far more seeders uploading data fragments.

The performance detriment could even be alleviated by allowing the user to request X different chunks in their trade, and the other end must return the appropriate chunks if they have them. This limits wasteful exchanges, while still ensuring there are no leechers.

Fun thought experiment that I expect has many more applications.

Posted 8/8/17