In a rapid series of events, Distributed Denial of Secrets was banned from Twitter for our BlueLeaks release, along with any links to our website, the leaked documents in question, or magnet links to the leaked documents in question (including blocking URL-shortened links, forwarding domains, and a ROT13-encoded version of the magnet link). Shortly after, one of the main DDoSecrets servers was seized by the German authorities, rendering the document archive and search engine unreachable. The raw documents were hosted with torrents and have all been mirrored elsewhere, but the loss of Twitter as a soapbox, as well as the index and search engine, are unfortunate setbacks.
Following the trend of other groups deplatformed from mainstream social-media, DDoSecrets has moved to Telegram and is looking at alternative media options for making announcements. On the hosted infrastructure side, we have dedicated servers for specific projects that remain online, but a shoestring budget limits our ability to operate a separate server for each task with many redundancies.
All of this is to emphasize the importance of decentralized systems, avoiding central points of failure and single-party censorship (as opposed to cooperative censorship). When considering the design of the Pursuance Project, we want a system that can outlive Pursuance as an organization, and can survive without the Pursuance Project’s servers if they’re lost due to lack of funding or censorship or equipment failure.
This post proposes a model for Pursuance without reliance on a permanent and trusted server, for use by groups like DDoSecrets that cannot afford such centralized dependencies. We begin by looking at peer-to-peer chat software, and building from there.
Ricochet is an anonymous encrypted “instant” messaging program. It works by hosting a Tor Onion Service on each user’s computer. To write to another user you need to know their onion service address, at which point both computers can connect to each-other’s onion service and send messages. This eliminates the need for any centralized chat server, requires no network configuration (such as domain registration and port forwarding), and hides every user’s IP address from one another.
Unfortunately, Ricochet has a range of shortcomings. Messages cannot be delivered while a user is offline, allowing only synchronous communication. There is no possibility for group-chats, and the trivial solution of “send a message to each user in the group” would require everyone in the group-chat to be online at once and is completely unscalable.
The good people at Open Privacy have been working on a more sophisticated chat system built on top of Ricochet, known as Cwtch (pronounced “kutch”, translating roughly to “a hug that creates a safe space”). The basic premise is to use Ricochet for peer-to-peer messaging, but to add an untrusted server that can cache messages during offline periods and facilitates group-chat. The server cannot read any messages, and will relay messages to any user that connects and asks. Each message is signed, preventing tampering, and includes a hash of the previous message from the user (blockchain-style), making omission easily detectable. Therefore the server cannot act maliciously without detection, and because it cannot identify users or distinguish their messages, it cannot target specific users and can only act maliciously at random.
Users create a group chat by direct-messaging another user (via Ricochet), establishing a shared symmetric key, and then relaying messages through the untrusted server encrypted with this key. Users are added to the group chat by providing them with the onion address of the relay and the symmetric key. Forward secrecy is achieved by periodically rotating the key and providing the update to all members of the chat via direct-message on Ricochet (and posting all messages using the old and new keys until rotation is complete). Backward secrecy is achieved by not providing these updated keys to compromised users. Users can be removed from a group by updating the shared key and providing it to all but the removed user. More technical details in the Cwtch whitepaper.
It’s important to note how minimal the role of the relay server is in this design. The majority of the work is performed by the client, which discards messages from the relay that aren’t encrypted with a group key the user is in, discards duplicate messages, and parses the contents of messages. The client can be connected to multiple groups on multiple servers concurrently, and a group can be moved from one server to another seamlessly, or even use multiple servers at once if messages are relayed through each server. Since the server is just a relay, and connects via Tor, it requires virtually no configuration and limited resources, and can be trivially deployed.
Cwtch has a few drawbacks (aside from being alpha software not ready for public use), but they are relatively small:
The user that created the group has the responsibility of periodically rotating keys and distributing those keys to users via Ricochet. This can be automated, but it requires that the founder periodically log in, and if they abandon the group then key rotation will cease and forward and backward secrecy are lost. This places the founding user in an “administrative” role, which is reflected by their ability to add and remove users, unlike in Signal where no user is an administrator and the group can only be added to.
There is no system for initial key exchange. Users sign their messages to mathematically prove a lack of tampering, but this is only effective if users exchange keys ahead of time over a trusted platform. This can be alleviated with something like Keybase proof integration to demonstrate that a Cwtch user has a well-established identity on many platforms.
Cwtch is intended to be used as an open source platform for peer-to-peer messaging with groups, allowing others to build more complex software and interactions on top of that foundation. So, let’s do just that…
What would it take to decentralize Pursuance so that it exists entirely client-side, with no storage except as messages sent via Cwtch to eliminate a need for a central Pursuance-specific semi-trusted server?
For basic functionality, not much is required. We can describe a pursuance as a Cwtch group-chat with a ton of meta-messages. The first message in a pursuance declares the rules of the pursuance (describing what roles exist) and how they interact), and metadata like the pursuance name. Subsequent messages take one of the following formats:
Changing Rules (Creating or destroying roles or amending how roles interact)
Changes Roles (Assigning or de-assigning a role from a user)
Tasks (Creating, closing, assignment, and commenting on tasks)
Under this sytem, every user in the pursuance has all data in the pursuance, including data they do not have permission to access. Therefore, all tasks must be encrypted to only be readable by roles with permission to read the data. A role exists not only as a designator, but also as a shared key allowing the user to read messages encrypted for that role. Adding and removing users both fall under the category of “changing roles”.
Clients have access to all pursuance rules, and a list of all users and their roles, and so clients can reject illegal messages, such as a user closing a task they have no access to. Since all content in a pursuance consists of tasks and discussions associated with those tasks, this messaging system describes the entire infrastructure of a pursuance.
Cwtch handles “desynchronizing” in a decentralized manner, allowing one user to contact another and get caught up on messages they’ve missed. This is intended to elegantly handle Cwtch relay servers that only cache recent messages, and to allow a smooth transition if the group has moved between servers (because, perhaps, the original server has gone offline). Pursuance inherits this re-synchronization, and allows users to catch up if the pursuance has moved servers.
So to summarize, the advantages of this change include:
Encrypted messaging provided by Ricochet and Cwtch instead of reinventing the wheel in Pursuance
No central and trusted server required, easily moved in case of server failure
Automatic recovery in case of data outage
Only have to maintain one piece of software, the Pursuance client, instead of a client and a server
However, there are a number of hurdles remaining (besides Cwtch itself, which remains in Alpha):
Synchronizing keys between different pursuances to cross-assign tasks can be complicated
Sending tasks between pursuances is challenging: the task must be sent by a user, and the receiving pursuance must somehow verify that the sending-user is part of an approved role in the sending-pursuance
All of this becomes harder if a pursuance can move from one server to another and disrupt lines of communication with its neighbors
Pursuance discovery remains challenging, and it is unclear what “joining” a pursuance looks like unless new users invited from inside
The “group leader” role from Cwtch must be inherited by Pursuance, probably as the pursuance founder; There must be an elegant process for migrating the pursuance and underlying Cwtch chat if the leader becomes inactive
Cwtch isn’t the only option for decentralized data storage and messaging, and alternatives should be considered. One notable alternative is Tox, which stores messages in a decentralized hash table, much like torrents. Another is the InterPlanetary File System, which acts somewhat like an HTTP and git replacement, storing web data with version history in a distributed filestore. A more complete Pursuance implementation may combine several of these technologies - for example storing encrypted tasks on IPFS so they can be accessed by multiple pursuances, but running metadata for a pursuance and exchanging keys within Cwtch. This post should be considered an early abstract for what distributed Pursuance software might look like.